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Compulsory vaccination for Covid-19 and human rights law 
Dr Lisa Forsberg*, Dr Isra Black**, Dr Thomas Douglas*, Dr Jonathan Pugh* 
Introduction and summary 
We are academics working in the areas of philosophy and law, with specialisations in, inter 
alia, moral and political philosophy, biomedical ethics, health law, and human rights law. 5 
Our submission pertains to compulsory Covid-19 vaccination:1 a requirement on 
individuals to undergo vaccination as a condition of release from pandemic-related 
restrictions on liberty, including on movement and association.2 
Our evidence is forward-looking. We expect that a Covid-19 vaccine will become available 
in sufficient quantity to enable population-wide immunisation.3 At that stage, the 10 
Government will need to consider the means of delivery, including whether it is necessary 
to legislate for compulsory vaccination. We consider the human rights law dimensions of 
compulsory vaccination by reference to the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European 
Convention on Human Rights. As such, our submission primarily addresses a live issue the 
second question in the Committee’s call for evidence: 15 
What will the impact of specific measures taken by Government to address the Covid-19 pandemic 
be on human rights in the UK? 
Our evidence takes the following form: 
1. A discussion of the reasons why compulsory vaccination may need to be considered; 
2. An overview of relevant legal provisions; 20 
3. An examination of the human rights law compliance of compulsory vaccination. 
 
Our analysis under 3 establishes two parity arguments: 
a. If Covid-19 ‘lockdown’ measures are compatible with human rights law, then it is 
arguable that compulsory vaccination is too (lockdown parity argument); 25 
b. If compulsory medical treatment under mental health law for personal and public 
protection purposes is compatible with human rights law, then it is arguable that 
compulsory vaccination is too (mental health parity argument). 
 
 
*University of Oxford; ** University of York. 
1 We note that there is disagreement about what compulsion means and as to whether different kinds of 
non-voluntary vaccination schemes are in fact compulsory schemes. This is in part a theoretical 
disagreement, and in part a practical one to do with the nature of state sanctions that back any scheme. See 
Emma Cave, ‘Voluntary vaccination: the pandemic effect’ (2017) 37(2) LS 279-304. In this submission, we 
take a coarse-grained or bird’s eye view of the issue, that is, we will not engage here with the detail of 
specific policy schema for compulsory vaccination. 
2 Much of our argument is applicable, mutatis mutandis, to Covid-19 prophylactic treatment. For clarity and 
brevity, we focus on vaccination. 
3 The UK Government has purchased 190m doses of three vaccine candidates, either on risk or in 
principle: Sarah Bosely, ‘UK secures deals for 90m doses of coronavirus vaccine’ The Guardian (20 July 
2020) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/20/uk-deals-doses-coronavirus-vaccine accessed 
20/07/20. 
 
 
Our chief conclusion is that, as and when a vaccine becomes available at scale, the 30 
Government should give serious consideration to compulsory immunisation as a means 
of reducing the impacts of Covid-19. There is an arguable case for the compatibility of 
compulsory vaccination with human rights law. 
1. Vaccine hesitancy 
A Covid-19 vaccine promises to be the best means to mitigate the impacts of the pandemic 35 
on individuals and society. Yet sufficient voluntary uptake of a vaccine cannot be 
guaranteed.4 Voluntary vaccine uptake may be limited by ‘vaccine hesitancy’, which the 
World Health Organization (WHO) describes as ‘the reluctance or refusal to vaccinate 
despite the availability of vaccines’.5 Vaccine hesitancy in respect of Covid-19 may arise 
because of the influence of anti-vaccination movements, the uneven demographic 40 
distribution of Covid-19 morbidity and mortality risks,6 or the mistaken belief that Covid-
19 immunity has already been acquired. 
Should a Covid-19 vaccine become available at scale, we cannot expect sufficient 
voluntary uptake. It is necessary for the Government to consider a policy of compulsory 
vaccination, with appropriate exceptions.7 Such a policy requires an assessment of its 45 
impact on human rights. 
 
2. Relevant law 
This section sets out the law relevant to both our parity arguments: the public health law 
that governs the control of disease; and mental health law that governs the detention and 50 
treatment of individuals with a mental disorder. 
2.1. Public Health Law 
Here we outline current law on disease control. We explain the absence of legal power to 
mandate vaccination and the legal basis for restrictions relevant to the lockdown parity 
argument. 55 
 
4 By sufficient we mean a level of vaccination in the population that achieves herd immunity. 
5 World Health Organization, ‘Ten threats to global health in 2019’ (2019) https://www.who.int/news-
room/feature-stories/ten-threats-to-global-health-in-2019 accessed 20/07/17. See also Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, ‘The rise of vaccine hesitancy’ (2019) https://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/blog/the-rise-of-vaccine-
hesitancy accessed 20/07/17. 
6 eg Among BAME communities, older people, people with pre-existing medical conditions, socio-
economically disadvantaged people etc. 
7 The requirement to vaccinate need not be exceptionless. For example, it should include exclusions for 
individuals in whom vaccination is likely to be unsafe or ineffective. In order to minimise restrictions on 
liberty, it might also include an exclusion for individuals who are willing to lower their infection and 
transmission risk through other means, for example, through submitting to ‘lockdown’ and other 
mitigation measures. The thought here is that for any one individual, either compulsory vaccination or 
other restrictions on liberty may be consistent with human rights law, but not both, that is, should an 
individual opt for restrictions on liberty, it may be hard to justify compulsory vaccination: see Isra Black, 
‘Refusing Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment and the ECHR’ (2018) 38(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
299-327. 
 
 
Part 2A of the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 (PHA 1984) and the 
Coronavirus Act 2020 provide the legal basis for Covid-19 pandemic control measures.  
Sections 45B and 45C of the PHA 1984 grant Ministers the power to make regulations for 
the purposes of ‘preventing, protecting against, controlling or providing a public health 
response to the incidence or spread of infection or contamination in England and Wales’. 60 
The Coronavirus Act 2020, schedules 18 and 19 give similar powers to the Northern 
Ireland Department of Health and to the Scottish Ministers respectively.8 
The regulations laid down under these legal regimes have included extensive restrictions 
on ‘persons, things or premises’9—commonly described as ‘lockdown’.10 For example, 
restrictions on leaving the home without ‘reasonable excuse’,11 restrictions on gatherings,12 65 
and restrictions or closures of businesses.13 
In addition, Schedule 21 of the Coronavirus Act 2020, grants extensive powers across the 
four UK jurisdictions to screen and assess individuals who have potentially been infected 
with coronavirus outside the UK. 
Neither the Coronavirus Act 2020, nor the PHA 1984 grant the executive the power to 70 
mandate vaccination. Indeed, section 45E of the PHA 1984 and schedules 18 and 19 of 
the Coronavirus Act 2020 rule out provisions requiring medical treatment, including 
‘vaccination or other prophylactic treatment’.14 
A policy of compulsory vaccination would thus require primary legislation. 
2.2. Mental Health Law 75 
We set out some provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983 relevant to the grounds on 
which a person may be detained—‘sectioned’—under the Act, and the legal basis for 
treatment of detained persons without consent. These are presented for the purposes of 
 
8 Schedule 18 of the Coronavirus Act 2020 amends the Public Health Act (Northern Ireland) 1967, and 
Schedule 19 of the Coronavirus Act 2020 creates public health protection regulations de novo. 
9 PHA 1984, section 45C(3)(c). 
10 See The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020, The Health 
Protection (Coronavirus) (Restrictions) (Scotland) Regulations 2020, The Health Protection (Coronavirus 
Restrictions) (Wales) Regulations 2020, The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) Regulations 
(Northern Ireland) 2020. There have been successive iterations of these statutory instruments, as the 
relevant governments have eased lockdown restrictions. 
11 The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020 (revoked), section 6. 
12 The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (No. 2) (England) Regulations 2020, section 5; The 
Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020 (revoked), section 7. 
13 The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (No. 2) (England) Regulations 2020, Schedule 2; The 
Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020 (revoked), Schedule 2. 
14 Coronavirus Act 2020, Schedule 18, section 25E (Northern Ireland); Coronavirus Act 2020, Schedule 
19, section 3 (Scotland). Note that the PHA 1984, section 45G(2)(a), the Coronavirus Act 2020, Schedule 
18, section 25G(2)(a), the Coronavirus Act 2020, Schedule 19, section 4(2)(a) all include the requirement 
that a person submit to ‘medical examination’, which the PHA 1984, section 45T(3) and Coronavirus Act, 
Schedule 18, section 25Y(3) define as including ‘microbiological and toxicological tests’. The Coronavirus 
Act 2020, Schedule 19, does not define medical examination for the purposes of Scotland. 
 
 
establishing the mental health parity argument below. This is an illustrative, rather than 
exhaustive, exposition of the law. 80 
Section 3 of the Mental Health Act permits the detention of an individual in hospital for 
treatment provided: 
(a) he is suffering from mental disorder of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate 
for him to receive medical treatment in a hospital; and 
(c) it is necessary for the health or safety of the patient or for the protection of other 85 
persons that he should receive such treatment and it cannot be provided unless he is 
detained under this section15 
(d) appropriate medical treatment is available for him. 
Part IV of the Mental Health Act 1983 governs consent to treatment for patients detained 
under section 3 of the Act. Section 63 of the Mental Health Act 1983 provides that the 90 
consent of any patient, including those who possess decision-making capacity under the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005, ‘shall not be required for any medical treatment given to him 
for the mental disorder from which he is suffering…’. Section 63 of the Act is subject to 
specific and limited exceptions in respect of certain kinds of treatment.16 
The legal regime for treatment without consent under the Mental Health Act 1983 95 
derogates from the common law requirement that individuals (who are so able) must give 
consent in order for medical treatment to be lawful.17 
Mental health law permits the detention of a person for treatment for the protection of 
others, and permits compulsory medical treatment of a person so detained. 
3. Compulsory vaccination and human rights law compliance 100 
We focus on the human rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), since these rights are domestically enforceable in virtue of the Human Rights Act 
1998 (HRA 1998). The UK is also a party to other international human rights law 
instruments, which we do not treat here.18 
We explain the basis on which a compulsory vaccination measure interferes with ECHR 105 
rights, and advance two parity arguments for why such interference may be justified. 
  
 
15 Emphasis added. 
16 Mental Health Act 1983, sections 57, 58, 58A. 
17 Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam); King's College NHS Foundation Trust v C [2015] 
EWCOP 80. 
18 See Emily Postan, ‘Written evidence from the Mason Institute for Medicine Life Sciences and the Law, 
the university of Edinburgh, School of Law (COV0115)’ (UK Parliament Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
2020) footnote 1 https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/5569/html/ accessed 20/07/22. 
 
 
3.1. Compulsory vaccination and interference with private and family life 
Our focus is on article 8 ECHR, which protects, inter alia, the right to private and family 
life,19 since this is most relevant to compulsory medical treatment. 110 
Article 8 ECHR provides: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life […] 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, 115 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights establishes that the provision of 
medical treatment without consent constitutes an interference with article 8 ECHR: ‘the 
imposition of medical treatment, without the consent of a mentally competent adult 120 
patient, would interfere with a person's physical integrity in a manner capable of engaging 
the rights protected under Article 8(1) of the Convention’.20 
Vaccination is defined as medical treatment for the purposes of the PHA 1984. A 
compulsory vaccination policy is likely to constitute an interference with the right to 
private life protected by article 8(1) ECHR for people who would refuse vaccination given 125 
the choice.  
Note, however, that article 8 ECHR is a qualified right. This means that interference with, 
for example, the right to private life, may be justified—interference will not violate article 8 
ECHR—so far as it is in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society in 
pursuit of the legitimate aims listed in article 8(2) ECHR. The most important element of 130 
the evaluation whether a measure constitutes a violation of article 8 ECHR is the analysis 
of its proportionality. 
Our strategy is to address the justification (including proportionality) of the interference 
with article 8 ECHR that compulsory vaccination entails through two parity arguments. 
First, if ‘the lockdown is lawful’ in terms of its human rights law compliance,21 then it is 135 
arguable that compulsory vaccination is too (lockdown parity argument). Second, if non-
consensual treatment under mental health law for public protection purposes is complaint 
with human rights law, then it is arguable that compulsory vaccination is too (mental health 
 
19 We doubt whether a compulsory vaccination scheme would attain the minimum level of severity so as to 
engage the protection of article 3 ECHR, which prohibits torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment: Ireland v United Kingdom (1979-80) 2 EHRR 25 (ECtHR); The Greek Case (1969) 12 YB 1 
(ECmHR). 
20 Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1 (ECtHR) [63]. 
21 Jeff King, ‘The Lockdown is Lawful’ (UK Constitutional Law Association, 2020) 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2020/04/01/jeff-king-the-lockdown-is-lawful/ accessed 2020/07/17; Jeff 
King, ‘The Lockdown is Lawful: Part II’ (UK Constitutional Law Association, 2020) 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2020/04/01/jeff-king-the-lockdown-is-lawful/ accessed 2020/07/17. 
 
 
parity argument). The idea underlying this strategy is that interferences with some of the 
interests protected by the ECHR are commensurable, that is, we can evaluate the degree of 140 
different kinds of interference with human rights on a comparable basis. This is the case in 
respect of the qualified rights, including article 8 ECHR. 
3.2. The lockdown parity argument 
The domestic and human rights law compliance of ‘lockdown’ measures, that is, 
restrictions on persons, things, and premises through the various Health Protection 145 
(Coronavirus, Restrictions) Regulations is a subject of controversy.22 
Some uncertainty regarding the compatibility of ‘lockdown’ with Human Rights Law, has 
been resolved by the recent Administrative Court decision of Dolan v Secretary of State for 
Health.23 The applicant, Mr Dolan, sought permission to bring a judicial review challenge 
to the legality of ‘lockdown’ on very extensive public law and human rights law grounds. 150 
The applicant failed on all grounds but one, which was reserved. We might characterise the 
current state of the law as follows: current ‘lockdown’ measures are compatible with article 
5 ECHR (the right to liberty), article 8 ECHR (the right to private and family life), article 
11 ECHR (the right to freedom and assembly) among others, with consideration of article 
9 ECHR (the right to freedom of religion) reserved. 155 
The Dolan decision does not deny that the lockdown engages the ECHR rights contained 
in articles 5, 8 and 11.24 Rather, interference with these rights is justified because of the 
potential human rights impacts of Covid-19 for individuals and others, and in virtue of the 
State’s positive duty to safeguard the life within its jurisdiction.25 The following is 
representative of the Court’s reasoning: 160 
 
22 For a flavour of the academic debate, cf Jeff King (n 21) and Alan Greene, ‘States should declare a State 
of Emergency using Article 15 ECHR to confront the Coronavirus Pandemic’ (Strasbourg Observers, 2020) 
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2020/04/01/states-should-declare-a-state-of-emergency-using-article-15-
echr-to-confront-the-coronavirus-pandemic/ accessed 20/07/17. See also the following written evidence to 
the Committee: Merris Amos, ‘Written evidence from Merris Amos, Professor of Human Rights Law, 
Queen Mary University of London (COV0026)’ (UK Parliament Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2020) 
https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/1624/html/ accessed 20/07/22; Merris Amos, 
‘Human Rights Law and the COVID-19 Pandemic in the United Kingdom Part 2 (COV0029)’ (UK 
Parliament Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2020) 
https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/1739/html/ accessed 20/07/22; David Mead, ‘Written 
evidence from Professor David Mead, School of Law, University of East Anglia (COV0077)’ (UK Parliament 
Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2020) https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/2881/html/ 
accessed 20/07/22; David Mead and Joe Purshouse, ‘Written evidence from Professor David Mead and Dr 
Joe Purshouse, School of Law, University of East Anglia (COV0068)’ (UK Parliament Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, 2020) https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/2783/html/ accessed 20/07/22; 
David Mead and Joe Purshouse, ‘Written evidence from Professor David Mead and Dr Joe Purshouse, 
School of Law, University of East Anglia (COV0069)’ (UK Parliament Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
2020) https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/2783/html/ accessed 20/07/22 
23 Dolan & Ors v Secretary of State for Health And Social Care & Anor [2020] EWHC 1786 (Admin). 
24 Save in the case of article 5 ECHR, where the restriction on staying overnight at a place other than one’s 
residence was held not to constitute a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of the ECHR: Dolan (n 23) 
[71]-[73]. 
25 Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245 (ECtHR). 
 
 
[T]here is no realistic prospect that the courts would find regulation 7 [restriction on 
gatherings] in its current form to be a disproportionate interference with the rights 
guaranteed by Article 11 of the Convention. The context in which the regulation was 
made was one of a pandemic where a highly infectious disease capable of causing death 
was spreading. The disease was transmissible between humans. The scientific 165 
understanding of this novel coronavirus was limited. There was no effective treatment 
or vaccine. 
The regulation was intended to restrict the opportunities for transmission between 
humans. The regulation therefore limits the opportunity for groups of individuals to 
gather together, whether indoors or outdoors. The regulation was time-limited and 170 
would expire after 6 months in any event. During that period, the government was 
under a duty to carry out regular reviews and to terminate the restriction if it was no 
longer necessary to achieve the public health aim of reducing the spread and incidence 
of coronavirus within the population.26 
What is important for the purposes of the lockdown parity argument is that the Regulations 175 
deriving their power from the PHA 1984 may provide for very substantial interferences 
with the ECHR rights that nevertheless are proportionate and justified. This is the case 
even though the impact of these measures falls unevenly across society and is very grave for 
many people.27 Yet, the PHA 1984 rules out compulsory medical treatment, including 
vaccination. This seems difficult to justify. 180 
Let us assume that a Covid-19 vaccine available at scale is safe, efficacious and administered 
in a conventional way, for example, by injection. Even accounting for any harms associated 
with non-consensual administration, the interference with an individual’s private life that 
compulsory vaccination entails seems proportionate in light of the seriousness of Covid-19 
risks and impacts. Moreover, a policy of compulsory vaccination seems less burdensome on 185 
the interests the ECHR protects as a whole than ‘lockdown’, that is, the degree of 
interference with bodily integrity entailed in compulsory vaccination seems less than the 
degree of interference with other liberties arising from lockdown 
In the event that a policy choice between ‘lockdown’ and compulsory vaccination were 
coterminous, it would, in our view, be strange to opt for lockdown over compulsory 190 
vaccination. The absence of the legal power to require individuals to undergo vaccination 
is hard to explain. 
It is arguable that if ‘lockdown’ restrictions are compatible with human rights law, so too 
is compulsory vaccination. Current public health law rules out medical treatment, 
including vaccination, but permits extensive restrictions on personal activity, such as free 195 
movement and association. The law privileges the interest in bodily integrity over other 
 
26 Dolan (n 23) [95]-[96]. We note that the more extensive ‘lockdown’ restrictions introduced in March 2020 
were not litigated in Dolan, due to their revocation. As such, their compatibility with human rights law has 
not been established. However, it is plausible that a court faced with a challenge to those regulations would 
reach similar outcome to Dolan. 
27 eg women subjected to domestic abuse or violence and black and minority ethnic people: see Emily 
Postan (n 18). 
 
 
liberties. The lockdown parity argument asks for a justification for treating bodily 
integrity as distinctively important relative to these other interests. 
3.3. The mental health parity argument 
In response to the lockdown parity argument above, it might be objected that there is indeed 200 
something distinctive about bodily or physical integrity. The idea here is that we cannot in 
fact compare interference with bodily integrity with interference with other liberties, or that 
interference with bodily integrity is always worse than interference with other liberties. Our 
mental health parity argument addresses this objection by reference to mental health law, 
which permits compulsory interference with bodily integrity. 205 
The criteria for detention under section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983 require that 
appropriate treatment for the person’s mental disorder is available and that it is not possible 
to provide treatment without detention. It is clear that the objective of section 3 of the 
Mental Health Act 1983 is not merely to detain individuals with mental disorder for their 
own protection or the protection of others, but also to administer treatment for these 210 
purposes. Section 63 of the Mental Health Act 1983 permits treatment without consent to 
persons detained under the Act, even if they possess decision-making capacity. 
Mental health law provides an example where the law permits—exceptionally—compulsory 
interference with a person’s bodily integrity for their own protection and that of others 
when the nature and degree of their circumstances gives warrant. The case law establishes 215 
that compulsory treatment in this context may be compatible with articles 3 and 8 ECHR.28 
We can argue by analogy from the compatibility with the ECHR of compulsory treatment 
in mental health law to the human rights law compliance of compulsory vaccination. In 
the context of highly infectious disease, every person is at risk of infection and a potential 
threat to the life and health of others—a person’s default state is of a nature and degree to 220 
warrant immunisation. Vaccination protects the individual from possible serious harms. 
Vaccination also contributes to the protection of the community generally and the 
protection of its vulnerable members specifically.29 Given vaccine hesitancy, it may be 
necessary to compel vaccination in order to achieve herd immunity. The justifications for 
compulsory vaccination map onto the criteria for detention and treatment contained in 225 
the Mental Health Act 1983. 
The law permits compulsory interference with bodily integrity under mental health law. 
This derogation from the common law principle of no treatment without consent is 
compatible with the ECHR. It is arguable that if compulsory treatment under mental 
health law is compatible with human rights law, so too is compulsory vaccination. 230 
Importantly, the same protected interest—that in bodily integrity—is at stake in the two 
contexts the mental health parity argument compares. 
 
28 Herczegfalvy v Austria (1993) 15 EHRR 437; R (on the application of B) v S (Responsible Medical Officer, 
Broadmoor Hospital) [2006] EWCA Civ 28. 
29 Including those who cannot safely undergo immunisation. 
